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@@ -85,8 +85,10 @@ proposal and a DAO that offsets operational costs and rewards operators.
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## Uncompromised hosts
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## Uncompromised hosts
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-This should go without saying - we assume that an adversary cannot read or write host memory, execute code, or otherwise
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-compromise the running host operating system or platform while or after the node is running.
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+This should go without saying - in the context of a single node, we assume that an adversary cannot read or write host
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+memory, execute code, or otherwise compromise the running host operating system or platform while or after the node is
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+running. If a supermajority of nodes is compromised, an attacker can produce arbitrary VAAs. If a superminority of nodes
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+is compromised, the network may no longer achieve consensus.
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Contrary to popular belief, hardware security modules do _not_ significantly change the risks associated with host
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Contrary to popular belief, hardware security modules do _not_ significantly change the risks associated with host
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compromise when dealing with cryptocurrency keys. A compromised host could easily abuse the HSM as a signing oracle,
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compromise when dealing with cryptocurrency keys. A compromised host could easily abuse the HSM as a signing oracle,
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