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@@ -223,17 +223,3 @@ is why it requires extra capabilities. Yes, other chains might want to do this t
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Storing keys on an HSM or using remote signers only partially mitigates the risk of server compromise - it means the key
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can't get stolen, but an attacker could still cause the HSM to sign malicious payloads. Future iterations of Wormhole
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may include support for remote signing using a signer like [SignOS](https://certus.one/sign-os/).
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-
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-## High Availability
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-
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-Multiple nodes with different node keys can share the same guardian keys. The node which first submits a signature
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-"wins" and the duplicate signature will be ignored by the network. Wormhole has no need for slashing, and therefore,
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-there's no risk of equivocation.
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-
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-⚠️ _This is not yet tested - see https://github.com/certusone/wormhole/issues/73_
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-
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-## Monitoring
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-
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-The node exposes a Prometheus endpoint for monitoring.
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-
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-⚠ TODO:️ _Actually build and document this: https://github.com/certusone/wormhole/issues/11_
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Leo